Reinterpreting Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act – Constitutional Law and Philosophy

This blogpost intends to further the reasonable classification argument to break down above-mentioned the ‘socio-legal recognition in the unity of family’, which has so far been the largest roadblock in furthering woman’s succession rights, by placing it in the larger framework of purposive interpretation. It concludes with a modern reading of the same, focusing on reform instead of continuing patriarchal control of property.

Textual Framework of Section 15(1)(b) and the question of Self-Acquired Property

Section 15(1) of the HSA lays down the order of succession for a Hindu woman dying intestate. It notes that first preference is upon the sons, daughters and husband of the woman. Second preference moves to the heirs of the husband, i.e, parents, siblings, and relatives of the husband. The third preference is women’s parents. This seemingly ordinary provision, when read in conjunction with the second preference, starts becoming problematic. There, the woman’s parents and her own blood relatives are placed below “heirs of the husband”.

As noted in Sonubhai, the primary reason behind this distinction is the family unit that a woman becomes a part of after her marriage, ensuring continuity of property. It is important to mention that Section 15(2) creates the source-rule, which ensures that the property inherited from her parents, in-laws or husband, go back to the appropriate source, making sure that there is no injustice in devolution. This makes it all the more important to see the injustice in seeing the devolution of a woman’s self-acquired property. The textual framework, taken in its absolute sense, would ensure that even a woman’s self-acquired property is devolved to her husband’s heirs.

Omprakash’s Absurdities and Unreasonable Classification

A peculiar situation came to the fore in the case of Ompakash v. Radhacharan where a woman, who was driven out of her matrimonial home within three months of marriage had her self-acquired property devolve to her husband’s sister’s sons over her own parents. This shows the absurdities ingrained within the text of Section 15 because it essentially means a distant relative will have a superior claim over women’s blood-relatives, making it necessary for us to apply interpretative mechanisms to solve them.

Additionally, it is also relevant to note that there is a case for unreasonable classification primarily because the succession rules for men are vastly different as noted under Section 8 of the HSA, making it difficult for the woman’s heirs to receive property. This is clearly indicated in the classes of heirs classified in the Schedule to the HSA where, as a principle, closer relations are given higher preference over remote ones. The Court in Mamta D. Vakil, which led to the division bench judgment in Kamal Anant, explicitly mentions this inconsistency and finds discrimination by noting:

“While …. a female succeeds equally and along with a male Hindu without discrimination between the sexes, her own succession is riddled with discrimination only on the ground of sex”.

Applying the Test of Rational Classification

The reasonable classification test lays down two requirements for valid classification, (a) that of intelligible differentia between the subjects being classified, and (b) rational nexus with the object of the legislation. The first requirement, (a) intelligible differentia, may further be broken down into two elements, (a1) purpose for the classification and (a2) principle underlying the differentiation. According to Chandrachud CJI in Davinder Singh, at the level of a1, the state has broad power to identify the purpose. However, at the a2 level the underlying principle must have both a nexus to the purpose and rationality. This burdens the state more to justify that the principle rationally meets the purpose.

Taking this test to its logical conclusion, the defenders of Section 15 would argue that it creates a reasonable classification between men and women in order to protect the principle of kin-ship based succession to achieve the legislative purpose of protecting the unity of family. However, this argument fails on two grounds, and as already noted in Mamta Vakil, the primary classification is based simply on sex, making it presumptively unconstitutional under Article 15. The only defense which may have some relevance is that of “protecting family ties”.  It is abundantly clear that the principle here does not meet the purpose, which by itself is unconstitutional, as will be argued below.

The “Family Unit” Defense Deconstructed

The primary defense offered for Section 15(1)(b) is that it preserves family unity by recognizing that a woman, upon marriage, becomes part of her husband’s family. Purposive interpretation entails interpreting the subjective goals created by the legislator and bringing them in line with the objective goals that the interpreter seeks to actualize. When we purposively interpret Section 15, we find the need to balance the subjective purpose of the text of Section 15 to recognize the original intent to maintain family unity and the objective purpose of aligning with evolving gender equality norms, in light of the fundamental constitutional value of respecting legislative domain.

This leads to the conclusion that the family unit defense is fundamentally flawed owing to three reasons. Firstly, it reinforces outdated patriarchal notions and is founded on the idea that a woman “merges” with her husband’s family upon marriage and loses connection with her natal family. It fails to acknowledge that the concept of family has evolved beyond patrilineal structures. It is reminiscent of patriarchal norms which we have tried to fight out of the system. It can also be seen as the worst of the medieval European fictions where the legal personality of women was subsumed within their husbands, as pointed out by Flavia Agnes.

Secondly, it ignores the constitutional evolution of the institution of marriage to one which is more grounded in justice and the rights of people. Supriyo explicitly recognizes that “it is change which characterizes the institution. All social institutions transmogrify with time and marriage is no exception”. At ¶123 and ¶124, Chandrachud CJI recognizes this transformation by citing the distance travelled between from sati to inter-caste, and inter-religious marriages.

 Lastly, adding onto the rational nexus test, if the objective was to preserve family unity, why does the principle only apply to women’s property and not to men’s? The inconsistency reveals that the actual purpose is not family unity but control of property along patriarchal lines.

A Modern Purposive Reading for Reform

Therefore, a purposive interpretation of Section 15 suggests that while there is a legitimate interest in property continuity, its apparent unequal and unreasonable gender-based classification make it increasingly difficult to reconcile with constitutional values. It must be acknowledged that the concept of family has evolved beyond patrilineal structures.

The provision could be reinterpreted to remove the absurdity and reconstructed to achieve its purpose of maintaining family connections to property without relying on gender as the primary differentiating factor. The law could adopt a gender-neutral approach that considers source-based inheritance patterns for all individuals, regardless of gender, thus maintaining family connections to property without perpetuating historical gender discrimination. This would ensure that women’s self-acquired property is not devolved to strangers and goes back to her blood relations.

The judicial trend shows us a line of progressive judgments that opened up even personal laws for fundamental rights challenges. In Youth Welfare, the Andhra Pradesh High Court distinguished between statutory and non-statutory personal law to hold that only the former would be covered by Article 13, thereby opening them up for an Article 14 challenge.

More recently, in Shayaro Bano, Nariman J and Lalit J concurred with this view and challenged statutory personal law against fundamental rights. The only caveat being that this was position was taken by just the two judges. Raiz and Naushad in their scholarly work contend that codification meant state intervention, and any Statute thereby born through state intervention necessarily has to comply with prescriptions of Part III.  Thereby, HSA can be opened up on a Part III challenge, and it ought to be interpreted beneficially for a protected class. Additionally, the 2005 amendment to Section 8 of HSA aimed to eliminate discrimination against women by granting them parity in inheritance within the Mitakshara coparcenary system. This legislative intent was reinforced in Vineeta Sharma. The proposed interpretation keeps in line with this judicial and legislative trend of furthering gender equality, which is a constitutional goal.

Dealing with Ambika Prasad

Ambika Prasad presents a contrary view, where a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld a law with seemingly discriminatory provisions against Article 14 and 15 challenges by employing reasoning that has been heavily criticized for not being grounded in established constitutional principles of equality. This case could be interpreted as supporting the view that, at least in some instances concerning property-related legislation with social welfare objectives, the scrutiny under Article 14 might have been less stringent. However, it is crucial to note that this is a contested interpretation and the judgment itself has been subject to strong criticism for its opacity and questionable reasoning regarding gender equality. In this blogpost, the contention comes from a purely personal law front, which we’ve already tried to open up on the basis that the law comes from a statutory basis.

Conclusion

The entrenched framework of Section 15 of the HSA reflects a legal construct that reinforces patriarchal control over property rather than a principled classification based on rational objectives. While its defenders argue for preserving family unity, the provision’s selective application to women’s self-acquired property exposes its inherent bias. The modern judicial approach, as seen in Mamta D. Vakil, increasingly recognizes that personal laws must evolve to align with constitutional principles of equality and autonomy.

Therefore, there is a need for a purposive reinterpretation of Section 15 which acknowledges the that kinship and succession should be rid of outdated gender roles. Instead, they must be dictated by equitable principles that reflect contemporary social realities. Reforming the provision to adopt a gender-neutral, source-based devolution mechanism would preserve the legitimate objective of property continuity without institutionalizing discrimination. The judiciary’s role, in this context, is not to dismantle legislative intent but to ensure that its application does not perpetuate systemic inequities—an imperative in the constitutional pursuit of gender justice.